This paper revisits the dynamic optimal taxation results of Rossi (1993, 1997). They use a growth model with human capital and find that optimal taxes on both capital income and labor income converge to zero in steady state. For one of the models under consideration, I show that the representative household's problem does not have an interior solution. This raises concerns since these corners are inconsistent with aggregate data. Interiority is restored if preferences are modified so that human capital augments the value of leisure time. With this change, the optimal tax problem is analyzed and, reassuringly, the Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi results are confirmed: neither capital income nor labor income should be taxed in steady state.
Introduction
In seminal papers, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that capital income should not be taxed in steady state. Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993, 1997) (hereafter JMR) extend this result to show that labor income should also be free from taxation in the limit. JMR add human capital to the model to derive their results. A key part of the analysis involves the manipulation of the household's …r s t order conditions. However, it will be shown below that for a popular class of models nested within the JMR framework, the household's problem does not have an interior optimum: Given any interior solution to the …r s t order conditions, there always exists a feasible variation that increases utility. This is of concern since an aggregative model with corners cannot …t the data. It also invites a closer look at the optimal tax results.
The class of models in which the di¢ culties arise is derived from Heckman (1976) . However, in Heckman's original formulation utility depends on e¤ective leisure -human capital multiplied by raw hours of leisure -while JMR's utility function depends only on raw leisure. 1 If utility is returned to the original Heckman form, the corners disappear and the standard …r s t order characterization of equilibrium may be used. In this case, it is shown that the JMR extension of the Judd-Chamley optimal tax result continues to hold. That is, neither labor income nor capital income should be taxed in the limit.
The analysis below reveals the source of the labor tax result. At an optimal steady state, it will be shown that the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production e¢ ciency theorem applies. Hence the producers of human capital (households) and the producers of output (…rms) must face the same relative price for labor. There can be no labor tax wedge in steady state.
The presentation here focuses on JMR (1997). Section III of JMR (1993) uses the same model and is thus subject to the same concerns -…r s t order conditions are used, yet the household's optimum (if it exists) actually has corners. A number of other papers use similar models and this may warrant a closer look to determine if corners arise. 2 Section 2 presents the JMR model and demonstrates that the household's optimum is not interior when technology has the Heckman speci…cation. Section 3 restores interiority by taking the original Heckman utility function. With 1 Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1999) consider similar issues in a related model without taxation. They …n d that non-convexities may arise when raw leisure enters the utility function. The anomalies identi…ed below are rather stronger in that the household's problem cannot have an interior solution, and this holds for any sequence of prices and taxes. 2 For example, see Davies et al. (2009) ; the raw time model in Gómez (2003) ; the raw time model in Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998); Pecorino (1993); and Trostel (1993) . Business cycle models with a similar structure include Ma¤ezzoli (2000) and the pure leisure time model in section III of Stokey and Rebelo (1995) . this change, the optimal tax policy is characterized in the limit. Section 4 is a brief conclusion.
Model
First the full JMR (1997) model is presented. Then the Heckman sub-class is considered. The representative household is a price taker with access to accumulation technologies for both physical capital and human capital. The optimization problem is
with initial conditions b 0 , h 0 , and k 0 given. This appears as (P.1) on page 97 of JMR (1997). Utility depends on consumption c t and hours of leisure 1 n mt n ht . In the latter, n mt is hours at work in the marketplace, n ht is hours used for human capital formation, and the time endowment is normalized to unity. The purchased good is used for investment as well as consumption: x ht is investment used in the production of human capital, x kt is investment in physical capital, and x mt is investment used in the production of e¤ective labor. Thus z t is e¤ective labor. Physical capital is k t ; human capital is h t ; exogenous lump sum transfers are T t ; the s are tax rates; b 0 is initial holdings of government debt. Non-negativity conditions apply; however, it is convenient to allow the household to choose x kt < 0 (physical capital may be sold), though this will never occur in equilibrium. Current value prices r t and w t , and present value prices p t , are determined in equilibrium.
The depreciation rates k and h are given parameters, each in (0; 1]. The production functions G and M are smooth, have positive and diminishing marginal products, and are homogeneous of degree one in (x; h).
used to substitute for x kt in the budget constraint. Then the problem becomes
For t 0 the coe¢ cient of k t+1 in the budget constraint is
If there is an interior optimum the household must face prices and taxes such that (1) equals zero for all t 0. See (1.d) in JMR (1997). If (1) were positive, k t+1 = 0 would be optimal. If (1) were negative, k t+1 " 1 would be optimal. It is worth emphasizing this no-arbitrage condition for physical capital because its companion condition for human capital will play a key role in the analysis. Since (1) equals zero, and since the e¤ective labor constraint clearly binds, the household's problem becomes
Heckman household technology -no interior optimum
At this point the household's production functions G and M are specialized as follows: G(x ht ; h t ; n ht ) =Ĝ(x ht ; n ht h t ) withĜ homogeneous of degree one in its two arguments, and M(x mt ; h t ; n mt ) = n mt h t . See Heckman (1976, p. S13) and also JMR (1993, § III). Since x mt is no longer relevant, the household's Clearly the physical capital accumulation constraint will bind. This can be problem now becomes
The purpose of this section is to show that this problem does not have an interior solution. The method will be to assume an interior solution and derive a contradiction. The Lagrangian for the problem is
If the solution were interior the …r s t order conditions for c t , n mt , n ht , x ht , and h t+1 respectively would be
Again, the goal is to use the …r s t order conditions, and more generally use the assumption of interiority, to generate a contradiction. From (3), (4), and (5),Ĝ 2 (x ht ; n ht h t )=Ĝ 1 (x ht ; n ht h t ) = (1 n t )w t ; t 0:
This looks very much like the …r s t order condition for a cost minimization problem. Indeed, this is the case. Let`t = 1 n mt n ht denote hours of leisure. Then the household's problem can be written as
Since h, x h , and n h do not appear in the utility function, they will be chosen to maximize income, i.e., to minimize
] subject to the human capital accumulation constraint and the non-negativity of market hours. In particular, for any f`t; h t g t 0 , the household will choose x ht and n ht to minimize x ht +(1 n t )w t h t n ht subject to these constraints. This is a standard cost minimization problem with an upper bound on one input. Under the maintained assumption that the solution is interior, it will satisfy (7). SinceĜ is homogeneous of degree one, the minimized cost is proportional to "output:"
where is the unit cost function forĜ(x h ; z h ) with notation z h := n h h for e¤ective labor in this sector.
Substitute the minimized cost back into the budget constraint. The household's problem becomes
Collect together the terms with h t and re-write the budget constraint as fol-lows:
At an interior optimum, the coe¢ cient of h t in (8) must equal zero for all t 1:
This states that the present value cost of a marginal unit of human capital (p t 1 t 1 ) equals its stock value next period (p t (1 h ) t ) plus its ‡o w return (p t (1 n t )w t (n mt + n ht )). The ‡o w rate of return is equalized across market hours and training hours due to the static optimality conditions. But note that the marginal unit of human capital does not augment the value of leisure hours since human capital does not enter the utility function (cf. Ladrón-de-Guevara et al., 1999).
If the expression in (9) were strictly negative (positive), any increase (decrease) in h t would provide more income for consumption, so optimality and interiority would be incompatible. This is much like the reasoning associated with (1) above. However, there is a key di¤erence here. There is a choice variable in (9):`t. So this is not a standard no-arbitrage condition on prices. Rather, (9) allows the household to create its own arbitrage opportunity at t 1 by re-allocating its hours at t. More speci…cally, if (9) were satis…ed, the household could deviate from this by increasing`t. Then the expression in (9) would become positive. Then less investment in human capital at t 1 would reduce h t and this would provide more income for consumption. The next paragraph demonstrates formally that this raises utility.
Let the superscript zero denote the hypothesized interior optimum, e.g.,`0 t . Consider a variationc s ,~s,h s at a given s 1. 4 Since the interior optimum 3 Lemma A.1 in the appendix con…rms that the …r s t order conditions (3)-(6) imply (9). 4 I.e., for all t 6 = s, consumption, leisure, and human capital remain c 0 t ,`0 t , and h 0 t . Also, note that the variationh s induces variationsx hs 1 ,ñ hs 1 ,x hs ,ñ hs through the cost minimization problem associated with (7) . Similarly, there are induced variations inñ ms 1 andñ ms . satis…es (9) , and since the variation must also satisfy the budget constraint (8) , it must be that
In particular, if the variation in`s is given additively as~s =`0 s + `, then
since (9) vanishes at the interior optimum. If alsoh
Hence u(c s ;~s) = u c 0 s
where the last equality follows from the static interior optimum condition u
, implied by (2) and (3). From (11) , for any h < 0 and for su¢ ciently small `> 0, the variation raises utility. This is inconsistent with the optimality of the interior solution. 5 Thus, the assumption of an interior optimum leads to a contradiction.
Optimal taxation with Heckman utility
This section revisits the optimal taxation results in JMR (1997). JMR show that both capital and labor income should not be taxed in the limit. This result is derived from the assumption of an interior solution to the household's problem. But as shown in section 2.1 above, the household's optimum is not interior when household technology takes the Heckman (1976) form. Interiority may be restored, however, if the household not only has Heckman technology but also Heckman (1976) utility: u(c t ; (1 n mt n ht )h t ): 5 Another possibility that could prevent the variation from raising utility is (1 Utility is a function of e¤ective leisure rather than just hours of leisure. This captures the idea that education provides enlightenment. After an individual receives an education s/he is more likely to appreciate an hour at a gallery, museum, theater, etc. By contrast, if most leisure activity is akin to sunbathing, it should be modeled as raw time. This section is not about sunbathing. With Heckman utility, it will be shown that the JMR result continues to hold: the steady state tax rate is zero for both capital income and labor income.
Household' s problem
With the modi…ed utility function, the …r s t order conditions for an interior optimum become
The analysis of the household's problem proceeds as in section 2.1. The cost minimization problem associated with (7) still applies, and hence so does the budget constraint (8) . With hours of leisure given by`t = 1 n mt n ht , the household solves
Unlike the analysis of (8) and (9) above, here the …r s t order conditions do not cause the coe¢ cient of h t in this budget constraint to vanish. To see this, re-write the budget constraint but separate out the term with e¤ective leisure:
At an interior optimum, the coe¢ cient of h t in the second and third lines of (12) must equal zero for all t 1:
This is based on a standard arbitrage argument. E.g., if the expression in (13) were negative, any increase in h t would provide more income for consumption. And this increase in h t could be matched with a reduction in`t to leave e¤ective leisure unchanged -both in the …r s t line of (12) and also in the utility function. The key distinction between (13) and the more problematic (9) is the presence of the choice variable`t in the latter. By contrast, in (13) the ‡o w return to a marginal unit of human capital, p t (1 n t )w t , applies to all hours, even leisure, due to the Heckman speci…cation for preferences.
Given (13) , the household's problem is (after re-arranging)
This is a completely standard dynamic utility maximization problem with choice variables c t and z`t :=`th t . The …r s t order conditions are (2 0 ) and (3 0 ). 6 Lemma A.2 in the appendix con…rms that the …r s t order conditions (3 0 )-(6 0 ) imply (13) .
The lemma below summarizes these results.
Lemma
The following conditions characterize an interior optimum for the household's problem with Heckman utility. For t 0,
The lemma does not guarantee that an interior optimum exists. However, if u satis…es Inada conditions and if the household has positive net wealth in (17) including transfers, then indeed c t > 0 and`th t > 0. Beyond that, there is indeterminacy. When (1 0 ) is satis…ed, fk t+1 g t 0 is indeterminate; hence from (14) , fx kt g t 0 is indeterminate. When (13) is satis…ed, fh t+1 g t 0 is indeterminate; hence from (15), fx ht ; n ht h t g t 0 is indeterminate other than the requirement in (7). And given these indeterminacies, (16) reveals that fn mt g t 0 is also indeterminate.
Equilibrium
The optimal tax problem is to select the equilibrium that gives the greatest utility to the household. So we need a complete characterization of equilibrium before we can solve the tax problem. In addition to the household's optimality conditions, the other equilibrium conditions are that …r m s are price taking pro…t maximizers and that the goods market clears. The production function F for the purchased good is homogeneous of degree one in physical capital and e¤ective labor. Thus pro…ts will be zero.
De…nition
Let h 0 > 0, k 0 > 0, and b 0 be given. Let fg t g t 0 be a given sequence of real government purchases. An equilibrium is a sequence fc t ;`t; n ht ; n mt ; x ht ; x kt ; h t+1 ; k t+1 ; p t ; r t ; w t ; c t ; k t ; n t g t 0 and a number that satisfy the household's optimality conditions in lemma 3.1.1 and also the following for t 0:
Note that (20) subsumes the physical capital accumulation equation (14) .
It is convenient to express the equilibrium entirely in terms of primal variables -quantities rather than prices. Thus some of the equilibrium conditions may be regarded as de…nitions of prices and tax rates, for a given allocation. Speci…cally, (18) de…nes the interest rate, (19) de…nes the wage, then (7) de…n e s the labor tax, then (13) de…nes the price ratio p t =p t+1 :
Since is the unit cost function forĜ, the cost minimizers satisfŷ
where the second equality follows from (7), and the last from homogeneity. Therefore (1; (1 n t )w t ) = 1=Ĝ 1 (x ht ; n ht h t ), and (21) yields
For any p 0 > 0, this recursively de…nes p t for t 1.
With these results, (1 0 ) de…nes the capital tax k t+1 for t 0. Note that p 0 and k 0 are not restricted. Given p 0 , (3 0 ) at time 0 together with (7) at time 0 de…ne . Then (2 0 ) de…nes c t for t 0. Equation (3 0 ) for t 1 presents a real restriction since , p t , and (1 n t )w t have already been determined. From (3 0 ) and (7),
where the second equality follows from (22). This is analogous to the restriction (v t 1 ; v t ) = 0 in problem (P.2) on page 100 of JMR (1997).
In order to express the budget constraint (17) in primal form, multiply through by the Lagrange multiplier and use (2 0 ) and (3 0 ) to get
where the last equality uses (3 0 ) and (7) at t = 0 to substitute for , uses (18) at t = 0 to substitute for r 0 , and also uses previous results to substitute for terms with (1 n 0 )w 0 . Equation (24) is the household's o¤er curve and is commonly referred to as the implementability condition.
The following lemma summarizes this section.
Lemma
In terms of primal variables, equilibrium is characterized by (15) , (16), (20), (23), and (24). In the next-to-last line of (24), p 0 and k 0 are unrestricted. By Walras' law, when these conditions are satis…ed the government's in…nite horizon present value budget constraint is redundant.
Optimal tax problem
The tax problem is not particularly interesting if the government can con…scate initial wealth. Thus it is customary to assign reasonable exogenous values to p 0 and k 0 in (24). Let z mt := n mt h t and z ht := n ht h t denote e¤ective labor for the market and for human capital accumulation. The tax problem is as follows:
where A 0 in the …r s t constraint denotes the last two lines of (24). Let be the Lagrange multiplier for the …r s t constraint. As in JMR (1997), introduce the auxiliary function
Then the Lagrangian for the problem is
Suppose the optimal tax equilibrium converges to an interior steady state in which all variables have …n i t e limits, including Lagrange multipliers. Let asterisks denote steady state values. Then in the limit the …r s t order conditions for c t , h t , z mt , z ht , x ht , and k t yield
(28)
(29)
The result may now be stated. 7 Since 2 is the multiplier for the resource constraint (20) the theorem's hypothesis 2 6 = 0 is very mild. Next it will be shown that 3 = 0. This will then be used to prove n = 0. Add (26) and (28) to get
In steady state, (23) yields
Since 0 < h 1, it follows that the term in square brackets is not zero, so
Finally it will be shown that n = 0. With 3 = 0 and 2 6 = 0, (29) implies 1 6 = 0. Thus (28) and (29) yieldĜ 2 =Ĝ 1 = W 2 = 2 , while (27) yields W 2 = 2 = F 2 . HenceĜ 2 =Ĝ 1 = F 2 . And from (7) and (19), this is precisely the condition under which n = 0.
For the model in section 2.1, the household's problem fails to have an interior optimum. Thus, this model is not well suited for the analysis of optimal taxation. With the modi…cation to utility in section 3, interiority is restored and the optimal tax problem yields the JMR (1997) result: neither labor income nor capital income should be taxed in steady state.
The intuition for the Chamley-Judd zero capital tax result is based on the idea that a tax on capital income is a tax on future consumption. This creates a distortionary wedge between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for consumption and the corresponding marginal rate of transformation. This wedge grows exponentially through time -just like compound interest (Judd, 2002) . Hence even a small capital income tax can generate large distortions if it is left in place a long time.
When human capital is present, similar reasoning applies. The accumulation technology for human capital creates an additional channel through which taxation can potentially cause explosive intertemporal distortions. Hence, at an optimal steady state, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for e¤ective leisure will equal the corresponding marginal rate of transformation. In terms of the model, this implies that constraint (23) will automatically be satis…ed at an optimal steady state. Since this constraint does not bind, in the limit the economy behaves as if there were no restrictions on the tax instruments. 8 Thus the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production e¢ ciency theorem applies: Marginal rates of transformation must be equal in the two production sectors, human capital and physical capital/consumption. Inspection of (7) and (19) reveals that this e¢ ciency condition yields a zero tax rate on labor income. In the limit, this tax must vanish; otherwise the two production sectors would face di¤erent relative prices.
Finally, given the problems with non-interiority that were considered here, one is led to wonder if other human capital models may lead to similar di¢ -culties. 9 It seems that caution is warranted in these situations.
Proof Use (3) and (4) to substitute for t+1Ĝ 2 (t + 1) in (6):
Therefore, since`t +1 + n mt+1 + n ht+1 = 1,
A comparison with (9) shows that the lemma will be proved if for all t 0, t = = p t (1; (1 n t )w t ). Recall that was de…ned to be the unit cost function for the production functionĜ. Therefore,
at an interior optimum. Multiply both sides of (4) by n ht , and both sides of (5) by x ht , then add:
by (3) and homogeneity ofĜ. Compare with (31) to get p t (1; (1 n t )w t ) = t as required.
A.2 Lemma If (3 0 )-(6 0 ) are satis…ed for all t 0 with 6 = 0 then (13) must hold for all t 1.
Proof Use (4 0 ) to substitute for t+1Ĝ 2 (t + 1) in (6 0 ), then simplify to get
for all t 0. Next, use (3 0 ) to substitute for t+1 u 2 (t + 1), then simplify to get
A comparison with (13) shows that the lemma will be proved if for all t 0, at an interior optimum. Multiply both sides of (4 0 ) by n ht h t , and both sides of (5 0 ) by x ht , then add:
by (3 0 ) and homogeneity ofĜ. Compare with (32) to get p t (1; (1 n t )w t ) = t as required.
A.3 Comparison with results by Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini
This appendix compares theorem 3.3.1 above with results in Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998), and the CEPR discussion paper version, Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1996) . In section 5 of the published version (1998), the authors discuss optimal taxation for models that are similar to those above. They state that the long run tax on both labor income and capital income is zero. The appendix of their discussion paper (1996) presents a proof for a result that is essentially a continuous time version of theorem 3.3.1 above. (Some details of the models di¤er, but one can easily make the adaptation.) If their proof were correct, then other than the continuous/discrete time di¤erence, theorem 3.3.1 would be subsumed within theirs. However, their proof contains errors. Their optimal taxation problem is stated on the bottom of page 33 of the discussion paper (1996):
where L( ; ) is a production function with constant returns to scale that uses physical capital and e¤ective labor to produce leisure. The last constraint is the source of the di¢ culty. It is derived from three equilibrium conditions: u C = ; the household's Euler equation with equilibrium interest rate _ = = F 1 (1 K )
K
; and the tax-distorted equality between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation u L L 1 =u C = F 1 (1
. This yields the last constraint (missing a minus sign) when u is Cobb-Douglas with equal shares. But this constraint is not in the right form for optimal control. It should be written as two constraints: u C = and
Then the optimal taxation problem is an optimal control problem with state variables K, H, and . Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini's use of an integral constraint has the attractive feature that it avoids complications over boundary conditions. (The state is not constrained by an initial condition, but there may be a transversality condition at in…nity.) However, the elimination of this boundary issue has created a problem that is not amenable to optimal control theory. Their (1996) …r s t order conditions on page 34 appear to be derived from the following current value Hamiltonian, where the notation E for the production function replaces the previous G:
The last two lines are a mix of stocks (integrals) and ‡o w s (integrands), and it is not clear how this …t s within the theory of optimal control.
